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8.1    Introduction
Public schemes aiming at facilitating small and medium- sized enterprises 
(SMEs) and young ﬁ  rms’ access to external ﬁ  nance are pervasive around the 
world. While these programs have been implemented for years, their evalua-
tion has long lagged behind. This task has, however, been taken up in recent 
literature. Several contributions propose an assessment of the performance 
of directed lending programs (e.g., Bach [2005] for France, Banerjee and 
Duﬂ  o [2004] for India, Prantl [2006] for Germany) or start-  up subsidies for 
the unemployed (Crépon and Duguet 2002). Another strand of the litera-
ture focuses on policies speciﬁ  cally designed to support innovative start- ups 
(Lerner [1999] for the United States; Brander, Egan, and Hellmann [2008] 
for Canada). All of these public interventions share the common feature 
that they are direct subsidies, which take the form of low interest rates or 
cheap equity ﬁ  nance.
In the present contribution, we evaluate the eﬀects of a loan guarantee 
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in charge of these programs provide insurance to lenders against borrowers’ 
risk of default, while the (often subsidized) insurance premium is paid for 
by the borrower. The main rationale for this type of public intervention is 
the widespread belief that the lack of collateral hinders the access of new 
ﬁ  rms to external ﬁ  nance. Credit guarantee programs can be found in most 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) coun-
tries (OECD 2002; Green 2003); as, for instance, in the United States (Small 
Business Administration’s [SBA’s] 7a Loan Program, described by Craig, 
Jackson and Thomson [2005]), the United Kingdom (Small Firms Loan 
Guarantee, launched in 1981), or France (SOFARIS, launched in the late 
1980s). Yet, although widespread, these programs have rarely been evaluated 
using ﬁ  rm level data.1 In this chapter, we rely on an exhaustive, large-  scale 
data set to ﬁ  ll this gap.
The impact of any directed policy is typically diﬃcult to evaluate, primar-
ily because of potential selection biases: ﬁ  rms that successfully apply to the 
program may be those that have the best growth prospects; that is, those that 
would have had no trouble raising external ﬁ  nance on ﬁ  nancial markets. 
They may enter the program both because the agency in charge might prefer 
attracting high-  potential ﬁ  rms and because these ﬁ  rms ﬁ  nd it proﬁ  table to 
apply to the program in order to beneﬁ  t from a subsidized, lower cost of 
external ﬁ  nance. When such selection occurs, ﬁ  rm level analyses will system-
atically overestimate the beneﬁ  ts of the program. To date, few papers have 
sought to alleviate this concern, although Bach (2005) and Banerjee and 
Duﬂ  o (2004) are important exceptions.
In this chapter, we take advantage of a quasi-  natural experiment to pro-
vide a causal assessment of the eﬀectiveness of the French loan guarantee 
program. The “SOFARIS” program was set up in the late 1980s and was 
initially restricted to ﬁ  rms active in the manufacturing and business services 
industries. In 1995, the public endowment of the program was increased 
and new industries (construction, retail and wholesale trade, transportation, 
hotels and restaurants, and personal services) became eligible. Using ﬁ  rms 
already eligible before 1995 as a control group, we focus on the behavior of 
ﬁ  rms active in these newly eligible industries before and after 1995 to provide 
diﬀerence- in- diﬀerences type of estimates of the impact of the program on 
various outcomes: debt, employment, and capital growth, as well as ﬁ  nancial 
expenses and bankruptcy probability.
Our results suggest that the French loan guarantee program signiﬁ  cantly 
impacted the development of newly created ﬁ  rms. Firms targeted by the 
program are found to raise systematically more external ﬁ  nance, pay lower 
interest expenses, and enjoy higher growth rates than other similar ﬁ  rms. 
1. Two notable exceptions are Uesugi, Sakai, and Yamashiro 2006 and Glennon and Nigro 
2005, who provide evaluations of the Japanese and US schemes, respectively, using ﬁ  rm level 
data sets. However, both of these contributions lack a proper identiﬁ  cation strategy, in that they 
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These results are shown to be causal, suggesting that this program is eﬀective 
at helping small, credit constrained ﬁ  rms to grow. Focusing on industry level 
data, we ﬁ  nd that the program is mostly eﬀective on the intensive margin: 
while the availability of loan guarantees allows newly created ﬁ  rms to be 
larger, it does not trigger an increase in the overall number of ﬁ  rms cre-
ated.
A surprising feature of our results is that the ordinary least squares (OLS) 
and the instrumental variable (IV) (diﬀerence- in- diﬀerences) analysis pro-
vide similar estimates, although the quasi-  natural experiment we consider 
has a strong predictive power on the probability of obtaining a guarantee. 
This absence of a selection bias suggests that the program is well designed. 
To obtain loan guarantees, eligible ﬁ  rms have to agree to pay an extra fee 
that substantially increases the ﬁ  nancial burden attached to the loan; this fee 
appears to be suﬃciently high to deter unconstrained ﬁ  rms from applying to 
the program, and low enough to allow some constrained ﬁ  rms to do so. This 
does not mean, however, that the program is fully eﬃcient. A particular con-
cern emerges from our ﬁ  nding that loan guarantees cause ﬁ  rms to become 
more likely to go bankrupt. This result is not surprising: loan guarantees 
make limited liability strict2 and can thus provide entrepreneurs with risk-
  shifting incentives. The overall eﬃciency of the program thus boils down to 
the trade-  oﬀ between increased growth and increased risk.
Our chapter is organized as follows: we ﬁ  rst present the French Loan 
Guarantee Program in terms of institutional background (section 8.2). We 
then provide some basic economic intuitions for the functioning of such a 
program (section 8.3). We present the data we use (section 8.4), and describe 
our estimation strategies (section 8.5) before presenting our results (section 
8.6). We then conclude in section 8.7.
8.2    Institutional  Design
Recently relabeled as “OSEO-  Garantie,” “SOFARIS,” was created in 
1982 as a French implementation of the SBA 7a Loan program. It is a 
semipublic agency: the French State owns 50 percent of voting rights, while 
a consortium of private banks and public ﬁ  nancial institutions (the “Caisse 
des Dépôts et Consignations”) owns the remaining 50 percent.
Bruneau (1990), Bachelot (1992), and a report issued by the French Min-
istry of Finance (Direction de la Prévision 1993) provide a good descrip-
tion of the main features of the program. The French government has total 
discretion for the creation of the various funds and, furthermore, decides 
upon their respective, broadly deﬁ  ned “objectives,” while the main source of 
2. While banks can in general ask entrepreneurs for personal guarantees, making the 
entrepreneur almost fully liable, they cannot do so if the loan they provide is guaranteed by 
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ﬁ  nancing is the French state budget. More speciﬁ  cally, SOFARIS is divided 
into four main funds, each of them having speciﬁ  c objectives:
•   The “Development Fund” aims at improving access to external ﬁ  nance 
for old, mature SMEs. In this case, the backed medium to long-  term 
loans are mainly supposed to ﬁ  nance capital expenditures.
•   The “Export Fund” is designed to help French SMEs settle into foreign 
markets.
•    The objective of the “Transmission Fund” is to secure ﬁ  rms’ transmis-
sion, most frequently when the owner gets retired. These periods are 
among the most risky of the SMEs’ life cycle (Betemps and Salette 
1997).
•    Lastly, the “Creation Fund” improves credit access for new ventures, 
mostly through medium to long-  term loans.
These broad objectives are imposed to SOFARIS, but the agency has 
full autonomy to choose the ways to reach them. In most cases, this trans-
lates into eligibility conditions that are speciﬁ  c to each fund and that are 
deﬁ  ned in terms of industry aﬃliation, ﬁ  rm age, size (total sales), and group 
aﬃliation. In most cases, only independent ﬁ  rms can beneﬁ  t from subsidized 
loans. Conditional on ﬁ  rms’ eligibility, all applications for SOFARIS guar-
antees are made by banks, and not by the ﬁ  rms themselves. Once granted, a 
guarantee allows the bank to recover a prespeciﬁ  ed amount of the remaining 
loan principal in case the ﬁ  rm defaults. This fraction usually varies between 
40 percent and 70 percent, and is not set case by case, but rather at the fund-
 year level, with the view to manage the aggregate risk faced by the SOFARIS 
agency. The counterpart of these guarantees is that the “beneﬁ  ting” ﬁ  rm 
has to pay a fee, which is also set at the fund-  year level, and that adds to the 
interest rate it has to pay to the bank. This fee usually varies between 50 and 
150 base points. In contrast to the US SBA’s 7a Loan Program, ﬁ  rms do not 
have to prove that they were unable to obtain credit on the regular market. 
It is also worth noting that the regulation of the French system is only made 
through prices (fraction guaranteed and fee paid to SOFARIS), while there 
is no “quantity” rationing.3
The ﬁ  nancial performances of the various funds—and the implied public 
subsidies—are quite contrasted, as shown in table 8.1. Assuming that the 
average return on equity (ROE) in the bank and insurance industries is about 
15 percent, the Creation Fund would beneﬁ  t from the largest subsidy (about 
36 million euros, or French franc [FF] 236 million), partially (11 millions 
euros, FF 72 million) cross-  ﬁ  nanced by the Development Fund.
In the remainder of the chapter, we focus on this latter Creation Fund, 
which speciﬁ  cally aims at fostering entrepreneurship and ﬁ  rm creation. 
3. For certain funds, only the largest applications are scrutinized on a case-  by-  case basis by 
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In 2005, the amount of loans backed by this fund represented one-  third 
(1.5 out of the 4.5 billion euros) of the total amount of debt guaranteed 
by SOFARIS. There were 26,000 ﬁ  rms (of the total 40,000 ﬁ  rms backed 
by a SOFARIS guarantee) that beneﬁ  ted from such early stage loan guar-
antees.
8.3      Some Basic Intuitions about Credit Guarantee Programs
The previous literature has long since outlined the main mechanisms 
inducing credit constraints (Hubbard 1996; Tirole 2006).
Adverse selection on one hand impedes the ability of the market to allocate 
credit through prices (interest rates) only, because it increases the propor-
tion of high-  risk investors in the pool of prospective borrowers (Stiglitz 
and Weiss 1981). However, in absence of an informational advantage, it is 
unclear how public intervention may alleviate this source of credit ration-
ing (Gale 1991). Bester (1985) showed that collateral might be used to 
screen safe from risky investors when collateral is relatively more costly 
for risky borrowers, but if the price of the credit guarantee cannot be dif-
ferentiated according to the (unobservable) risk of entrepreneurs lacking 
collateral, it is impossible to replicate this self- revealing mechanism. In such 
an adverse selection setting, the introduction of a loan guarantee program 
might, however, increase the set of ﬁ  nanced projects, be they in some cases 
excessively risky, depending on the price (up- front fee) and guaranteed share 
set by SOFARIS. The public agency precisely chose to combine a high up- 
front fee with a high level of guarantee, thus making low- risk and collateral-
 rich ﬁ  rms that do not need to be subsidized reluctant to apply, while allowing 
riskier or less wealthy entrepreneurs to obtain more external ﬁ  nancing. In 
the presence of several sources of heterogeneity, however (risk of the project, 
net initial worth, proﬁ  tability of project, etc.), the two available instruments 
are not suﬃcient to precisely target a speciﬁ  c population of ﬁ  rms deﬁ  ned 
over all relevant dimensions. This induces potential selection issues (see sec-
tion 8.4) or increased social ineﬃciencies. For example, ﬁ  rms with ineﬃcient 
Table 8.1  Description of the various SOFARIS funds (2005)
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earnings  
Operating 





Development 354 79 28 5 11 22 28 –11
Transmission 394 88 18 5 12 11 13 2
Financial 
 restructuring 181 40 –5 2 5 –8 –20 14
Creation 375 84 –18 5 11 –24 –28 36
All funds   1,582  354   37   21   47   11   3   42248    Claire Lelarge, David Sraer, and David Thesmar
risk may obtain ﬁ  nancing with a guarantee while ﬁ  rms with eﬃcient risk 
would not get ﬁ  nanced, or ﬁ  rms that might have obtained ﬁ  nancing anyway 
would ﬁ  nd it proﬁ  table to apply to the program.
Moral hazard, on the other hand, reduces the ability of prices alone to 
clear lending markets because once the loan is extended the actions of the 
borrower are not independent of the lending rate (Myers and Majluf 1985). 
The problem may be partly alleviated if the debtor is able to pledge private 
collateral to be transferred to the bank in case of project failure. Credit 
guarantees, however, do not reallocate risk between debtor and lender, but 
to the government instead, so that these schemes decrease the overall risk 
faced by both parties, and do not generically alleviate moral hazard.4 This 
reasoning suggests that loans issued with public credit guarantees may be 
riskier than nonbacked loans (Chaney and Thakor 1985). Moreover, public 
support schemes in general are likely to have deleterious impact on eﬃciency, 
since (conversely) credit- constrained entrepreneurs have strong incentives to 
ﬁ  nd ways of cutting costs.
The previous developments alone show that the expected impact of the 
launching of a loan credit guarantee program might increase the set of 
entrepreneurs obtaining ﬁ  nance, but at the cost of subsidizing riskier proj-
ects and lower eﬀorts of both the entrepreneur and the lender (screening 
and monitoring costs) such that the net eﬀect on total welfare might even be 
negative. Additional arguments explain why such programs may, however, 
be appealing; for example:
•   There are some nonconvexities in the production function: for instance, 
there is a minimum level of investment (indivisibility) needed to start a 
company (see, e.g., Galor and Zeira 1993).
•   Credit guarantees might correct for unequally distributed endowments, 
if lack of collateral is more acute for certain individuals or in poorer 
geographical areas (Craig, Jackson, and Thomson 2005).
•   Guarantee schemes can help diversify risk across lenders with diﬀerent 
sectoral or geographic specialization.
•   Credit guarantees help starting relation-  based relationships between 
banks and entrepreneurs (Petersen and Rajan 1994), which may be 
fruitful in the future.
•   There are some positive “social” externalities associated to increased 
entrepreneurial dynamism: fostering innovative and informational 
spillovers, infant industry, or learning-  by-  doing arguments (Honohan 
4. Arping, Loranth, and Morrison (2009) show that guarantees might in some cases enhance 
welfare when entrepreneurs having positive NPV investment projects are excluded from the 
credit market due to lack of collateral. More speciﬁ  cally, the authors show that for suﬃciently 
small guarantees, the borrower’s incentives are increasing in the size of the guarantee, and 
hence, so is welfare. However, as previously stated, the actual SOFARIS guarantee is quite 
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2008), and so forth.5 This kind of argument reaches obviously further 
away from young ﬁ  rms’ ﬁ  nancing concerns.
We argue that the program evaluation that follows will provide some evi-
dence about the existence of credit constraints faced by entrepreneurs in 
case the program proves to increase young ﬁ  rms’ external ﬁ  nancing, either 
on the extensive or intensive margins, and if the underlying additional proj-
ects have a total net present value (NPV), which is greater than the implied 
public subsidy. However, we also recognize that these conditions are neither 
necessary6 nor suﬃcient since the cost of the program may be higher than 
the subsidy.7
8.4    Estimation  Strategy
We face a standard evaluation problem and implement two diﬀerent esti-
mation strategies, one at the ﬁ  rm level, the other at the industry level, in order 
to evaluate the impact of SOFARIS guarantees on the future development 
of newly created ventures.
8.4.1      General Firm Level Setup
Estimated Equation








t T    t    j   εi,j,t
where i denotes ﬁ  rms, j their industry, and t denotes time; this speciﬁ  cation 
allows for industry-  speciﬁ  c trends. Variable T (term) describes whether the 
outcome Y is observed in the short-  (two years after ﬁ  rm creation), medium-  
(four years), or long-  (six years) term. The analyzed outcomes Y are, respec-
tively: debt, employment, and capital growths; interest rate or probability of 
bankruptcy ﬁ  ling. Furthermore, SOF i,j,t 1–  T is a dummy variable indicating 
whether the ﬁ  rm has been subsidized one year after its creation (at date 
t   1 –   T); X(0) stands for a set of observable characteristics observed in the 
year of the ﬁ  rm’s creation (T   0); that is, before treatment. The choice of 
these controls is partly determined by data availability: initial employment, 
capital and debt, and also geographical location, legal form, and calendar 
month of ﬁ  rm creation. Year ( t) and industry ( j) ﬁ  xed eﬀects are included 
in all regressions.
5. This may be the case when, for instance, an unemployed is creating a new venture: there 
is a positive externality through the Unemployment Insurance fund in this latter case (Crépon 
and Duguet 2002).
6. If the program scheme is not designed in a suitable way, it will not be able to alleviate 
credit constraints.
7. Li (2002) shows that general equilibrium (mis-  )allocation eﬀects might be large.250    Claire Lelarge, David Sraer, and David Thesmar
If self-  selection in the group of SOFARIS-  subsidized ﬁ  rms is correctly 
accounted for by the observed characteristics X(0),  t, and  j, then OLS esti-
mates are consistent. We present them as a benchmark for our empirical anal-
ysis. One-  to-  one nearest neighbor matching estimators are also computed, 
which also rely on the same unconfoundedness assumption (Rosenbaum and 
Rubin 1983) but do not rely on an homogeneous treatment assumption.
The obvious limitation of this ﬁ  rst (benchmark) approach is that self-
 selection is potentially driven by characteristics that are unobservable in the 
data; for example, manager ability, risk, or proﬁ  tability of the underlying 
projects. As an example, for a given level of risk, entrepreneurs having more 
proﬁ  table projects are more likely to accept to pay the up-  front fee associ-
ated with a SOFARIS guarantee. This would lead to an upward bias on   in 
equation (1) if Y(T) is a measure of proﬁ  tability since this coeﬃcient would 
then partly reﬂ  ect the self- selection process, in addition to the “true” impact 
of beneﬁ  ting from a SOFARIS guarantee. Conversely, it may be the case that 
for a given level of risk, the SOFARIS agency only selects projects that are 
proﬁ  table enough to be socially desirable (on the basis of an information set 
that is larger than the information available to the econometrician), but not 
proﬁ  table enough to access private funding. This would lead to a downward 
bias on the parameter of interest. It is diﬃcult to anticipate beforehand 
which of the two previous eﬀects is empirically relevant.
Exploiting a Quasi-  Natural Experiment
In order to solve these potential endogeneity issues, we take advantage 
of the history of the SOFARIS system. More speciﬁ  cally, we argue that its 
1995 extension can be considered as a valid quasi- natural experiment, which 
provides an industry level variation in the probability of getting a guaran-
teed loan. Moreover, we argue that this shock most probably did not aﬀect 
the average post-  grant behavior of backed ﬁ  rms.
Indeed, the recent history of SOFARIS was marked by two major 
shocks:
1.  In 1993, a newly elected right-  wing government extended this small-
  business oriented program widely. Between 1993 and 1995, the funds avail-
able to SOFARIS were almost multiplied by three. 
Unfortunately, this large shock does not provide much identifying varia-
tion since it aﬀected all eligible ﬁ  rms the same way and at the same date. 
Therefore, it is diﬃcult to disentangle the eﬀects of the extension of the 
SOFARIS program from those resulting from alternative cyclical shocks 
experienced by the French economy over this period.
2. In 1995, a subsequent right-  wing government decided to keep on 
increasing this loan guarantee scheme not only by further increasing the 
budget allocated to SOFARIS—and therefore increasing the amount of Entrepreneurship and Credit Constraints    2 5 1
subsidized loans in already eligible industries—but also by enlarging the eli-
gibility conditions to additional industries. Construction, retail and whole-
sale trade, transportation, hotels and restaurants, and personal services 
became eligible at this date while manufacturing industries and corporate 
services remained so.
This latter event appears to provide a better identiﬁ  cation opportunity 
than the previous one, since under the assumption that new eligibility was 
not decided in anticipation of (negative) cyclical shocks aﬀecting speciﬁ  -
cally the corresponding newly eligible industries—and not the previously 
eligible ones—then we are able to take advantage of this shock in a stan-
dard diﬀerence- in- diﬀerences (IV) setting.
Figure 8.1 depicts the overall evolution of the various SOFARIS funds 
over the last decades, whereas ﬁ  gure 8.2 focuses on the “Creation Fund.” In 
1995, the number of SOFARIS-  backed ﬁ  rms in already eligible industries 
was multiplied by 2.5, whereas it was multiplied by 20 in the newly eligible 
(“treated”) industries. It is also noticeable that a few ﬁ  rms belonging to the 
not yet eligible industries already beneﬁ  tted from a SOFARIS guarantee 
before 1995, which can be explained by changes in industry classiﬁ  cation 
over the period and possibly by measurement errors.
We adopt a simple Heckman approach to our evaluation problem, in 
which the previously described diﬀerential shock provides us with a natural 
exclusion restriction to use as an instrumental variable for program partici-
pation. To begin, estimate a ﬁ  rst- stage probit equation explaining the prob-
ability of obtaining a guaranteed loan (one year after creation):
Fig. 8.1    Loans guaranteed by SOFARIS, by program (fund)252    Claire Lelarge, David Sraer, and David Thesmar
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t 1   dt   dj   ei,j,t,
where POST is a dummy equal to 1 if t is strictly later than 1995, TREAT 
is a dummy equal to 1 if the industry j (of ﬁ  rm i) became newly eligible 
after 1995, and 0 if it was already eligible before this date. Variable t is 
a simple time trend. Our speciﬁ  cation allows for eligible industry-  speciﬁ  c 
trends, and eligible industry post-  speciﬁ  c trends. Therefore, the coeﬃcient 
b is identiﬁ  ed on the post-  1995 increase in the probability of getting a 
guaranteed loan in newly eligible industries relative to already eligible 
ones. Note that due to the small size of the program, the probability of 
getting a guaranteed loan in the ﬁ  rst year after ﬁ  rm creation, conditional 
on eligibility, is on average as low as 0.7 percent. Simple linear models were 
therefore found to be too coarse to adequately investigate the tails of the 
ﬁ  rms’ distribution, which are precisely of interest in our setting. Hence, 
identiﬁ  cation relies partly on distributional assumptions, but our estimates 
are not sensitive to the choice of probit or logit speciﬁ  cations (see the fol-
lowing).
In a second-  stage estimation, we then implement a Heckman selection 
model8 to take account of the potential endogeneity issues in equation (1):
Fig. 8.2    Number of guaranteed ﬁ  rms, creation fund only (treatment versus 
control industries)
8. Another way to proceed would be to use the predicted value from equation (2) as an 
instrument in a two-  stage least square regression of equation (1) (see Wooldridge 2002). This 
speciﬁ  cation provides qualitatively similar results to ours, but coeﬃcients (and standard errors) 
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where ϕi,j,t– 1 and  i,j,t– 1 are computed from equation (2) (Mill’s ratios). Here, 
the coeﬃcient of interest,  , is not uniquely identiﬁ  ed on the speciﬁ  c para-
metric (Gaussian) assumption, since identiﬁ  cation also relies on an exclu-
sion restriction: the interaction POSTt– 1   TREATj is used as an instrumen-
tal variable for (SOFARIS) treatment (standard diﬀerence- in- diﬀerences 
setting).
All regressions are also clustered at the industry post-  1995 period level 
(Bertrand, Duﬂ  o, and Mullainathan 2004).
8.4.2    Industry  Level  Regressions
Our analysis of the impact of the SOFARIS loan guarantee program on 
ﬁ  rm creation relies on a further analysis carried on at an industry level. In 
this setting as well as at the ﬁ  rm level, we face important potential endo-
geneity issues, ﬁ  rst of all induced by simultaneities: for example, growing 
industries generate increased ﬁ  rm creation rates and therefore increased 
SOFARIS applications, thus leading to an upward bias on OLS estimates.
We therefore rely on the same quasi-  natural experiment and on a similar 
identiﬁ  cation strategy, based on the same implied exclusion restriction. Here 
estimation relies on a simple two- stage- least- square approach. More speciﬁ  -
cally, we estimate a ﬁ  rst-  stage industry level equation of the following form 
(similar to equation [2]):
(4)  ln  (SOF. Firms)j,t   a   b.POSTt   TREATj   m.t   TREATj
    c.t   POSTt   TREATj   g1.Xj,t
(0) 
    g2.POSTt   Xj,t
(0)   dt   dj   ej,t
using the same notations as in equation (2), and where Xj,t
(0) stands for lagged 
industry level controls: return on assets (ROA), leverage, employment, and 
capital of ﬁ  rms aged three years or less.
The second-  stage equation takes the following form:
(5) ln  (ﬁ  rm creation)j,t        .ln (SOF.Firms)j,t    .t   TREATj
   .t   POSTt   TREATj   ξ1.Xj,t
(0)   ξ2.POSTt   Xj,t
(0)
   t    j   εj,t,
where ln (SOF.Firms)j,t is the predicted value obtained from equation (4). We 
analyze three diﬀerent measures of ﬁ  rm creation: the (annual) unweighted 

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number of newly created ﬁ  rms, and the employment or capital weighted 
numbers of ﬁ  rm creations. All regressions are also clustered at the industry 
post-  1995 period level.
8.5      Data and Descriptive Statistics
8.5.1    Sample  Construction
Our information about the SOFARIS (Creation Fund)-  backed loans is 
directly sourced from the SOFARIS Information System and includes ﬁ  rm 
and loan level information over the 1989 to 2000 period, speciﬁ  cally: the 
date at which any guarantee was granted, the amount of the backed loan, 
the fraction of the loan that is guaranteed, and the upfront fee paid to 
SOFARIS. These ﬁ  les also include the oﬃcial (and unique) ﬁ  rm identiﬁ  ers 
(Siren code) allowing to match this information with complementary ﬁ  rm 
level data sets.
The SIRENE ﬁ  les reporting the yearly creations of French ﬁ  rms are built 
at the Firm Demography Department of the French National Institute of 
Statistics (INSEE). Firm level information about employment and geo-
graphical location is also sourced from these ﬁ  les.
The BRN (“Bénéﬁ  ce Réel Normal” tax regime) ﬁ  les consist of ﬁ  rms’ bal-
ance sheets collected yearly by the ﬁ  scal administration (“Direction Générale 
des Impôts”) and provide ﬁ  rm level accounting information (value added, 
capital investment, debt, ﬁ  nancial fees, etc.). This tax regime is mandatory 
for companies having a level of annual sales higher than FF 3.8 million, but 
can also be chosen by smaller ﬁ  rms.9 Of SOFARIS ﬁ  rms, 63 percent choose 
this tax regime, while only 29 percent of the total of eligible companies are 
retrieved in the BRN ﬁ  les. Accounting information about the remaining 
ﬁ  rms (which chose a “simpliﬁ  ed” tax regime or even the personal income 
tax) is so scarce that it is unfortunately impossible to further analyze this 
potential selection.
Last, bankruptcy ﬁ  les also provide an exhaustive list of all bankruptcy 
ﬁ  lings in France since 1987, along with the identifying number of the cor-
responding bankrupt companies.
We matched these four data sets in order to track all corporations or lim-
ited liability ﬁ  rms that were created over the 1988 to 1999 period and that 
provided information to the ﬁ  scal administration (BRN ﬁ  les) within their 
ﬁ  rst year of life. We restricted the deﬁ  nition of “SOFARIS” treatment to 
ﬁ  rms obtaining a guarantee within their second year of life; they represent 
75 percent of the total number of ﬁ  rms backed by the Creation Fund. We 
thus exclude from our analysis:
9. The corresponding ﬁ  les include around 600,000 ﬁ  rms, in the private nonﬁ  nancial, non-
agricultural sectors each year and cover around 80 percent of total output in the French 
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•    Firms that were subsidized during their ﬁ  rst year because no pretreat-
ment observable information is available in their case.
•    The few ﬁ  rms that were subsidized in their third year of life, for homo-
geneity concerns.
“Control” ﬁ  rms are all other (corporation or limited liability) ﬁ  rms, which 
have not been backed by the SOFARIS Creation Fund. Our ﬁ  nal sample 
contains 1,362 treated ﬁ  rms and 205,852 control ﬁ  rms, resulting in a sample 
of 207,214 enterprises. All of these ﬁ  rms were observed in their ﬁ  rst year of 
existence, and then (conditional upon surviving) in their third and seventh 
year.
8.5.2    Descriptive  Statistics
Table 8.2 reports descriptive statistics about the whole ﬁ  rm level estima-
tion sample. Only 0.7 percent of all newly created ﬁ  rms obtained a SOFARIS 
Table 8.2  Summary statistics: Firm level data, ﬁ  rst year after creation
    Mean   Median  
Standard 
deviation   Min   Max  
Number of 
observations
Guaranteed loan .007 0 .08 0 1 207,214
Treatment (treated industries) .51 1 .49 0 1 207,214
Employment(0) 1.82 0 5.85 0 640 188,634
Start- up  capital(0) 2175 50 87,447 50 2.6 107 207,214
Debt(0) 659 1 21,714 0 5 106 207,214
Employment growth(0/2) .96 1.2 1.14 –2  2 127,734
Employment growth(0/4) 1.02 1.4 1.14 –2  2 109,262
Employment growth(0/6) 1.04 1.42 1.15 –2  2 112,247
Debt growth(0/2) .4 0 1.23 –2  2 172,643
Debt growth(0/4) .38 0 1.39 –2  2 143,795
Debt growth(0/6) .31 0 1.46 –2  2 112,247
Capital growth(0/2) .66 .61 1.01 –2  2 159,138
Capital growth(0/4) .59 .76 1.20 –2  2 134,889
Capital growth(0/6) .57 .82 1.26 –2  2 106,113
Average int. rate(2) .26 .12 .31 0 .99 109,446
Average int. rate(4) .27 .12 .33 0 1.05  94,204
Average int. rate(6) .27 .12 .35 0 1.13  71,976
Bankruptcy(2) .017 0 .13 0 1 207,214
Bankruptcy(4) .09 0 .29 0 1 207,214
Bankruptcy( )   .24   0   .42   0   1   207,214
Source: BRN and SIRENE ﬁ  les for the 1989–2000 period.
Notes: “Guaranteed loan” is a dummy equal to 1 when the ﬁ  rm received a guaranteed loan within the 
ﬁ  rst year after creation (period 1). “Treatment” is a dummy variable equal to 1 for industries that became 
eligible after 1995. “Employment(0),” “Start-  up capital(0)” and “Debt(0)” are number of employees, initial 
start-  up capital and initial ﬁ  nancial debts in the year of creation(0), respectively. “Employment growth” 
(resp. “Debt” and “Capital growth”) (i/j) stands for growth of employment (resp. ﬁ  nancial debt and total 
assets) between year i and year j, where period (0) is the year of creation. “Average interest rate” is mea-
sured as ﬁ  nancial expenses divided by total ﬁ  nancial debt. “Bankruptcy” (resp. “Bankruptcy(2),” “Bank-
ruptcy(4),” and “Bankruptcy( )” are dummies indicating whether the ﬁ  rm ﬁ  led for bankruptcy at some 
point (resp. in the second year after creation, in the fourth year after creation, or at some date).256    Claire Lelarge, David Sraer, and David Thesmar
loan, which indicates that this program is a very small one. Of the sample 
ﬁ  rms, 51 percent belong to industries that became eligible after 1995 (“treated 
industries”). The average size of newly created ﬁ  rms is around two employ-
ees in their ﬁ  rst year of life, and the ﬁ  nancial burden for such a young ﬁ  rm is 
extremely high: the median interest rate (deﬁ  ned as total ﬁ  nancial costs over 
debt) is 12 percent. Dispersion is high (or this variable is quite noisy10) since 
the mean of this variable is as high as 27 percent. Of all ﬁ  rms, 24 percent get 
bankrupted and ﬁ  le- in in this legal procedure. Unfortunately, we are not able 
to accurately track the alternative ways of exiting the market; for example, 
mergers or deaths without formal legal bankruptcy procedure.
Table 8.3 reports the main features of SOFARIS ﬁ  rms. Their level of 
employment at creation is higher than the average of all newly created ﬁ  rms 
(2.6 versus 1.8 employees) but their average start-  up capital and initial 
debt are halved as compared to the average over all newly created ﬁ  rms 
(FF 977,000 and FF 358,000 as compared to FF 2,175,000 and FF 659,000, 
respectively). The subsequent evolution of SOFARIS ﬁ  rms is also notice-
able: whereas the level of their debt (and the corresponding ﬁ  nancial burden) 
catches up with those of nontreated young ﬁ  rms, their employment growth 
does not slow down and remains at a higher level than the average growth 
rate of nonsubsidized ﬁ  rms. This also results in higher rates of bankruptcy 
ﬁ  lings, both in the medium-   (16 percent against 9 percent in the fourth year 
after creation) and in the long-  terms: 37 percent of all observed SOFARIS 
ﬁ  rms end up in a bankruptcy procedure, whereas as previously stated, this 
rate is no higher than 24 percent in the full sample.
Lastly, table 8.4 reports the main features of our industry level sample. 
Data were aggregated at the two- digit level and we end up with 264 industry-
  year observations over the 1989 to 2000 period. On average, twenty-  seven 
ﬁ  rms per year beneﬁ  ted from a SOFARIS guarantee in each sector, while 
more than 8,000 ﬁ  rms were created yearly, so that the rate of subsidized ﬁ  rms 
is below 1 percent in most industries. The average ratio of total guaranteed 
loans over outstanding ﬁ  nancial debt is 1.5 percent, but the median is also 
below 1 percent.
8.6    Results
8.6.1    First-  Stage  Estimation
The ﬁ  rst-  stage equation enables to check that the quasi-  natural experi-
ment provides a signiﬁ  cant identifying shock on the probability of getting 
a guaranteed loan, since the interaction POSTt   TREATj is highly sig-
niﬁ  cant whatever the (logit or probit) speciﬁ  cation. The obtained student 
10. Variables that are not closely linked to the ﬁ  scal computations are less precisely reported 
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statistic is above 3.5 in each case (see table 8.5) and signiﬁ  cance of the IV is 
preserved when including treatment industry and treatment industry post-
 1995  period- speciﬁ  c trends.
Due to the small size of the program, the absolute magnitude of this shock 
is not higher than 0.25 percentage point (see table 8.6) for ﬁ  rms in “treated,” 
newly eligible industries, but since the base was on average around 0.7 per-
cent, and even lower in “treated” industries, this shock represents a sizable 
increase of 36 percent in the rate of subsidized ﬁ  rms.
8.6.2      Impact on Access to Credit: Debt Growth and Financial Burden
We ﬁ rst investigate whether getting a guaranteed loan causally implies 
that ﬁ  rms take on more debt. If ﬁ  rms are credit constrained, and under the 
further assumption that the scheme is properly calibrated, subsidized ﬁ  rms 
beneﬁ  t from more favorable borrowing conditions and from an easier access 
to banking credit. Therefore, in this case, SOFARIS guarantees enable eli-
Table 8.3  Summary statistics: Firm level data—ﬁ  rms with guaranteed loan
    Mean  Median  
Standard 
deviation  Min  Max  
Number of 
observations
Treatment (treated industries) .35 0 .47 0 1 1,362
Employment(0) 2.61 1 5.3 0 60 1,154
Start- up  capital(0) 977 250 4,000 50 45,000 1,362
Debt(0) 358 9.5 1,142 0 19,251 1,362
Employment growth(0/2) 1.28 1.57 .85 –2  2 1,001
Employment growth(0/4) 1.32 1.71 .9 –2  2 856
Employment growth(0/6) 1.29 1.69 .96 –2  2 591
Debt growth(0/2) 1.0 1.52 1.15 –2  2 1,243
Debt growth(0/4) .81 1.6 1.38 –2  2 1,045
Debt growth(0/6) .43 .96 1.57 –2  2 755
Capital growth(0/2) .84 1.02 .99 –2  2 1,152
Capital growth(0/4) .73 1.01 1.13 –2  2 975
Capital growth(0/6) .59 .93 1.23 –2  2 699
Average int. rate(2) .19 .10 .25 0 .99 1,125
Average int. rate(4) .24 .11 .29 0 1.05 954
Average int. rate(6) .27 .12 .33 0 1.13 618
Bankruptcy(2) .03 0 .18 0 1 1,362
Bankruptcy(4) .16 0 0.37 0 1 1,362
Bankruptcy( )   .37   0   .48   0   1   1,362
Source: BRN and SIRENE ﬁ  les for the 1989–2000 period.
Notes: “Treatment” is a dummy variable equal to 1 for industries that became eligible after 1995. “Em-
ployment(0),” “Start-  up capital(0),” and “Debt(0)” are number of employees, initial start-  up capital, and 
initial ﬁ  nancial debts in the year of creation(0), respectively. “Employment growth” (resp., “Debt” and 
“Capital growth”) (i/j) stands for growth of employment (resp., ﬁ  nancial debt and total assets) between 
year i and year j, where period (0) is the year of creation. “Average interest rate” is measured as ﬁ  nancial 
expenses divided by total ﬁ  nancial debt. “Bankruptcy” (resp., “Bankruptcy(2),” “Bankruptcy(4)” and 
“Bankruptcy( )” are dummies indicating whether the ﬁ  rm ﬁ  led for bankruptcy at some point (resp., in the 
second year after creation, in the fourth year after creation, or at some date).258    Claire Lelarge, David Sraer, and David Thesmar
gible ﬁ  rms to be more leveraged. On the contrary, if the pricing scheme is 
inadequate (low enough), a windfall eﬀect could occur, that unconstrained 
ﬁ  rms only apply for SOFARIS guarantees in order to get lower interest 
rates than on the nonsubsidized credit market.11 In this latter “winner pick-
ing” case, SOFARIS ﬁ  rms would not show higher levels of debt but a lower 
ﬁ  nancial burden.
We test these two predictions by estimating equation (3) with the two-  , 
Table 8.4  Summary statistics: 2-  digit industry level data
    Mean   Median  
Standard 
deviation   Min   Max  
Number of 
observations
Number of guaranteed ﬁ  rms 26.48 12 35.21 0 182 264
log(number of guaranteed ﬁ  rms) 2.61 2.56 1.22 0 5.21 264
Firms creation 8,379 2,623 11,845 28 43,565 264
log(ﬁ  rms creation) 7.67 7.87 1.93 3.33 10.68 264
Employment creation 7,866 3,686 9,986 77 44,559 264
log(employment creation) 8.09 8.21 1.51 4.36 10.70 264
Treatment 0.36 0 0.48 0 1 264
ROA(0) 0.157 0.145 0.159 –0.188 0.541 264
Leverage(0) 0.515 0.502 0.187 0.199 0.928 264
log(assets)(0) 16.01 15.89 1.23 13.42 19.01 264
log(employment)(0) 9.69 9.71 1.30 6.62 11.75 264
#Sofaris ﬁ  rms   
#Eligible ﬁ  rms
 
0.010 0.005 0.012 0 0.060 264
Amount of guaranteed loan     
Outstanding debt of elig. ﬁ  rms   0.015   0.009   0.020   0   0.105   264
Source: BRN, RSI, and SIRENE ﬁ  les for the 1989–2000 period.
Notes: log(“Number of guaranteed ﬁ  rms”) is the logarithm of the total number of ﬁ  rms with a guaran-
teed loan, deﬁ  ned at the 2-  digit industry level. Treatment is a dummy variable equal to 1 for industries 
that became eligible after 1995. Except when speciﬁ  ed, all variables refer to ﬁ  rms aged three years or less. 
“ROA(0)” (resp., “Leverage(0)”) is deﬁ  ned, at the industry level, as the sum of EBITDA (resp. ﬁ  nancial 
debt) divided by the sum of total assets in the industry and is measured in 1989. “log(assets)(0)” (resp., 
“log(employment)(0)”) is the logarithm of the sum of assets (resp., employment) in the industry measured 
in 1989. “#Sofaris ﬁ  rms/#Eligible ﬁ  rms” is the fraction of ﬁ  rms in the industry with a guaranteed loan. 
“Amount of guaranteed loan/Outstanding debt of elig. ﬁ  rms” is the amount of guaranteed loan among 
overall debt of eligible ﬁ  rms in the industry. Control Industries: Manufacture of Wearing Apparel, Dress-
ing and Furs (18); Manufacture of Wood and Wood Products (20); Publishing, Printing and Reproduc-
tion of Recorded Media (22); Manufacture of Chemicals and Chemical Products (24); Manufacture of 
Rubber and Plastic Products (25); Manufacture of Basic Metals (27); Manufacture of Fabricated Metal 
Products, excluding Machinery and Equipment (28); Manufacture of Machinery and Equipment n.e.c. 
(29); Manufacture of Oﬃce Machinery and computers (30); Manufacture of Electrical Machinery and 
Apparatus n.e.c. (31); Manufacture of Medical, Precision and Optical Instruments, Watches and Clocks 
(33); Computer and Related Activities (72); Research and Development (73); Other Business Activities 
(74). Treated Industries: Construction (45); Sale, Maintenance and Repair of Motor Vehicles and Mo-
torcycles, Retail Sale of Automotive Fuel (50); Wholesale Trade and Commission Trade, except of 
Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles (51); Hotels and Restaurants (55); Land Transport, Transport via Pipe-
lines (60); Post and Telecommunications (64); Recreational, Cultural and Sporting Activities (92); Other 
Service Activities (93).
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four-   and six-  year growth rate12 of bank debt (table 8.7) and the level of 
ﬁ  nancial burden after two, four, or six years, respectively, (table 8.8) as 
dependent variables. We measure ﬁ  nancial burden as the average interest 
rate; that is, the ratio of ﬁ  rms’ ﬁ  nancial expenditures over ﬁ  nancial debt. 
This ratio is a quite precise measure of the marginal interest rate in the ﬁ  rst 
years, but it becomes noisier as time goes by, since it then mixes various debt 
issuances.
Concerning the evolution of debt, results obtained from the selection 
Table 8.5  First stage: Probability of guaranteed loan and industry eligibility (1989–2000)
Probability of guaranteed loan
Logit model Probit model
(Sample mean   0.007)   (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)
Post   Treatment 1.1∗∗∗ 1.3∗∗∗ .99∗∗∗ .31∗∗∗ .44∗∗∗ .32∗∗∗
(.13) (.17) (.25) (.051) (.06) (.091)
Treatment   t .1 .035
(.063) (.022)
Post   Treatment   t –.15∗ –.055∗
(.088) (.031)
Decile of employment(0) no yes yes no yes yes
Decile of start-  up capital(0) no yes yes no yes yes
Decile of debt(0) no yes yes no yes yes
Region FE no yes yes no yes yes
Legal form FE no yes yes no yes yes
Month of creation FE no yes yes no yes yes
Industry FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Number of observations   188,720   151,618   151,618   188,720   151,618   151,618
Source: BRN and SIRENE ﬁ  les for the 1989–2000 period.
Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 when the ﬁ  rm obtained a guaranteed loan in the 
ﬁ  rst year after creation (current year). “Treatment” is a dummy variable equal to 1 for industries that 
became eligible after 1995. “Post” is a dummy variable equal to 1 for observations posterior to 1995 
(excluding 1995). Variable t is a linear trend. “Decile of employment” (resp., “Start-  up capital” and 
“Debt”) stands for ten dummies equal to 1 for each decile of initial employment (resp. start-  up capital 
and ﬁ  nancial debt). “Region” is a dummy variable for each region of location (twenty- one regions). Legal 
Form is a dummy equal to 1 when the ﬁ  rm is the ﬁ  rm is a limited liability company. “Month of Creation” 
are twelve dummies for each month of creation. Columns (1), (2), and (3) report results obtained from a 
logit speciﬁ  cation, while columns (4), (5), and (6) report results obtained from a probit speciﬁ  cation. 
Each regression includes year and industry ﬁ  xed eﬀects. Observations are clustered at the industry post 
level.
∗∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 10 percent level.
12. Our estimation results are all potentially aﬀected by an attrition bias as, for instance, 
SOFARIS ﬁ  rms exiting the sample might have more debt than the average ﬁ  rm exiting the 
sample. We do not address this issue yet.260    Claire Lelarge, David Sraer, and David Thesmar
model are overall fairly similar to results obtained either from the matching 
or from the OLS approaches13 and are quantitatively large: the growth of 
bank debt in the ﬁ  rst two years is higher by 0.69 percentage point (around 0.5 
standard deviation) when ﬁ  rms get a guaranteed loan, and after controlling 
for the initial level of debt, which could generate nonconvexities and thresh-
old eﬀects. This eﬀect is also long lasting, since the diﬀerence persists with 
the same magnitude four years after the date of the SOFARIS grant. The 
further analysis of ﬁ  rms’ ﬁ  nancial burden enables to disentangle whether 
Table 8.6  First stage: Probability of guaranteed loan and industry eligibility, 1989–2000 
(marginal eﬀects   100 reported)
Probability of guaranteed loan
Logit model Probit model
(Sample mean   0.007)   (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)
Post   Treatment 0.562∗∗∗ 0.377∗∗∗ 0.243∗∗∗ 0.451∗∗∗ 0.356∗∗∗ 0.231∗∗∗
(0.082) (0.069) (0.088) (0.088) (0.069) (0.091)
Treatment   t 0.018 0.018
(0.010) (0.011)
Post   Treatment   t –0.027∗ –0.029∗
(0.014) (0.015)
Decile of employment(0) no yes yes no yes yes
Decile of start-  up capital(0) no yes yes no yes yes
Decile of debt(0) no yes yes no yes yes
Region FE no yes yes no yes yes
Legal form FE no yes yes no yes yes
Month of creation FE no yes yes no yes yes
Industry FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Number of observations   188,720   151,618   151,618   188,720   151,618   151,618
Source: BRN and SIRENE ﬁ  les for the 1989–2000 period.
Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 when the ﬁ  rm obtained a guaranteed loan in the 
ﬁ  rst year after creation (current year). “Treatment” is a dummy variable equal to 1 for industries that 
became eligible after 1995. “Post” is a dummy variable equal to 1 for observations posterior to 1995 
(excluding 1995). Variable t is a linear trend. “Decile of employment” (resp “Start-  up capital” and 
“Debt”) stands for ten dummies equal to 1 for each decile of initial employment (resp., start-  up capital 
and ﬁ  nancial debt). “Region” is a dummy variable for each region of location (twenty-  one regions). 
“Legal form” is a dummy equal to 1 when the ﬁ  rm is a limited liability company. “Month of creation” 
are twelve dummies for each month of creation. Columns (1), (2), and (3) report results obtained from a 
logit speciﬁ  cation, while columns (4), (5), and (6) report results obtained from a probit speciﬁ  cation; 
marginal eﬀects at the sample mean reported. Each regression includes year and industry ﬁ  xed eﬀects. 
Observations are clustered at the industry post level.
∗∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 10 percent level.
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this long-  term eﬀect is driven by a more favorable access to longer-  term 
loans, or whether it is driven by a more favorable sequence of debt contracts; 
for example, in the case of trust building with the ﬁ  rm’s bank.
Indeed, results in this latter case show that obtaining a guaranteed loan 
decreases signiﬁ  cantly the obtained interest rate in the very short run, by 
6 percentage points according to matching/  OLS estimates, and up to 23 
percentage points (i.e., 0.70 standard deviation of the interest rate variable) 
according to the parametric selection model. Results obtained using the 
latter estimation strategy are statistically diﬀerent from the OLS/  matching 
estimates, which means that matching/  OLS estimates are probably aﬀected 
by attenuation endogeneity biases. We do not obtain any statistically sig-
niﬁ  cant impact of the program on ﬁ  nancial burden in the longer run, which 
we interpret as evidence in favor of the trust building hypothesis: only the 
ﬁ  rst loan is backed by a subsidized guarantee and is associated to low inter-
est rates, while the measure of ﬁ  nancial burden in the longer run adds up 
new, nonsubsidized—and therefore more expensive—loans. These results 
remain, however, purely descriptive since loan sizes and interest rates are 
obviously not independent and their empirical evolution is diﬃcult to inter-
pret in the absence of a proper structural (pricing) model.
8.6.3      Impact on Firm Development: Employment and Capital Growth
Do credit constraints hinder ﬁ  rm growth? First, insights regarding this 
aspect are obtained estimating a reduced form equation also based on equa-
tion (3). At this stage, the dependent variables are the two-  , four-  , and six-
  year employment and capital growth, respectively.
Estimates for employment growth are reported in table 8.9. As in the case 
of ﬁ  nancial burden, estimates obtained from the selection model are higher 
than estimates obtained from OLS/ matching methods. These latter estimates 
are thus potentially aﬀected by downward endogeneity biases: ﬁ  rms having 
lower growth perspectives than average self-  select into SOFARIS-  backed 
loans, or are selected by their bank or by the SOFARIS agency. This result 
may alternatively be driven by the fact that SOFARIS ﬁ  rms also correspond 
to larger ﬁ  rms at birth in terms of employment which, absent any SOFARIS 
intervention, would therefore have experienced relatively smaller subsequent 
employment growth due to a standard “regression toward the mean” phe-
nomenon.
Taking selection explicitly into account and controlling for initial level of 
employment, we obtain that SOFARIS ﬁ  rms experience higher employment 
growth both in the short run (growth rates higher by 49 percentage points; 
i.e., 0.42 standard deviation after two years) and, conditional on surviving, 
in the long run (70 percentage points; i.e., 0.61 standard deviation after six 
years). The OLS and matching estimates appear more sensible: the obtained 
growth premiums reach around 25 percentage points in the short run, and 
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has around 2.6 employees in its ﬁ  rst year after creation, this implies that 
SOFARIS-  backed loans enable ﬁ  rms to create an additional 0.65 job in the 
short run, and 0.42 job in the longer run.
Beyond employment, the increased debt capacity brought by a guaranteed 
loan can be allocated to increased investment and faster capital growth. 
Results obtained (reported in table 8.10) are robust to the estimation 
method; OLS and matching estimates lead to underestimate, if anything, 
the true impact on the dynamics of ﬁ  rms’ capital. Controlling for initial 
size, a guaranteed loan has a permanent, signiﬁ  cant, and sizable impact 
on capital growth, although results obtained from the selection model are 
not precisely estimated. Guaranteed ﬁ  rms experience faster capital growth 
by around 55 percentage points, both in the short and medium run. This 
represents about 0.5 standard deviation of capital growth rates in this popu-
lation of young ﬁ  rms.
8.6.4    Probability  of  Bankruptcy
Reducing the burden of credit constraints should induce a more balanced 
development over the ﬁ  rm’s life cycle and therefore fewer failures. On the 
other hand, as previously stated, a potential concern with loan guarantee 
programs is that they might induce more risk taking by both entrepreneurs 
and banks.14
In order to investigate which eﬀect dominates in the French case, we 
simply use the probability of bankruptcy (after two or four years, or at any 
point in time) as a dependent variable in equation (3).
We obtain (results reported in table 8.11) that ﬁ  rms obtaining a guaran-
teed loan experience a subsequent signiﬁ  cant and sizable increase in their 
default (exit) probability: this increase ranges from 6 percentage points in 
the ﬁ  rst two years, to 29 percentage points overall, which represents some 0.8 
standard deviation of the average probability of bankruptcy. An alternative 
interpretation of these results might, however, be that, conditional on exit, 
guaranteed ﬁ  rms have more incentives to ﬁ  le for a formal bankruptcy pro-
cedure (rather than exiting the market in a more informal way); for example, 
because there are more stakeholders in the company.15
14. A ﬁ  rst argument relies on the deformation of the entrepreneurs’ objective function 
induced by SOFARIS. Even in absence of external guarantees, entrepreneurs theoretically 
beneﬁ  t from a limited liability. However, it is fairly common that banks require private guaran-
tees from entrepreneurs (like mortgage on their private real estate). An important feature of the 
SOFARIS system is that it is explicitly forbidden to require such additional private guarantees 
when the loan is already backed by SOFARIS, so that entrepreneurs de facto have a limited 
liability and thus incentives to adopt riskier strategies. The second argument is indirect and 
relies on banks’ behavior. Indeed, banks have lower incentives to monitor SOFARIS-  backed 
loans (i.e., investigate ﬁ  rms’ use of assets, etc.). The entrepreneur, who is residual claimant on 
its ﬁ  rm, should anticipate this behavior and adopt riskier strategies.
15. However, using an alternative measure of ﬁ  rms’ failures (exits from the BRN tax ﬁ  les) 
provides similar results, though less signiﬁ  cant. The main drawback of this latter alternative 
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8.6.5      Assessing the Impact on Firm Creation
We now turn to the industry level sample in order to assess the impact of 
early stage credit constraints on industry level entrepreneurial dynamism 
and ﬁ  rm creation. First-  stage estimates are reported in table 8.12 and show 
that the institutional shock we use as a quasi- natural experiment has a strong 
explanatory power on the industry number of guaranteed loans, since the 
F-  statistic obtained in the most complete speciﬁ  cation for the instrumental 
variable (Post   Treatment) is above 24. Being in a “newly eligible”16 indus-
try after 1995 almost triples the number of guaranteed loans as compared 
16. See previously: some SOFARIS guarantees were granted before 1993 in theoretically 
non-  (yet) eligible sectors.
Table 8.12  Industry level ﬁ  rst-  stage regression: Number of guaranteed loans and 
industry eligibility (1989–2000)
log(number of guaranteed ﬁ  rms)
      (1)   (2)   (3)  
Post   Treatment 1.8∗∗∗ 1.3∗∗∗ 1.1∗∗∗
(.17) (.26) (.22)
Treatment   t .068∗∗ .068∗∗
(.032) (.032)
Post   Treatment   t .057 .057
(.077) (.078)
Post   ROA(0) –1.9∗∗∗
(.35)
Post   Leverage(0) –.69∗∗
(.34)
Post   log(Assets)(0) –.21∗∗
(.084)
Post   log(Employment)(0) .51∗∗∗
(.11)
Year FE yes yes yes
Industry FE yes yes yes
Number of observations 264 264 264
  R2   .89   .89   .91  
Source: BRN, RSI and SIRENE ﬁ  les for the 1989–2000 period.
Notes: The dependent variable is the logarithm of the total number of ﬁ  rms with a guaranteed 
loan, deﬁ  ned at the 2-  digit industry level. “Treatment” is a dummy variable equal to 1 for in-
dustries that became eligible after 1995. “Post” is a dummy variable equal to 1 for observations 
posterior to 1995 (excluding 1995). Variable t is a linear trend. All control variables refer to 
ﬁ  rms aged 3 years or less. “ROA(0)” (resp. “Leverage(0)”) is deﬁ  ned, at the industry level, as the 
sum of EBITDA (resp. ﬁ  nancial debt) divided by the sum of total assets in the industry and is 
measured in 1989. “log(Assets)(0)” (resp. “log(Employment)(0)”) is the logarithm of the sum of 
assets (resp. employment) in the industry measured in 1989. Each regression includes year and 
industry ﬁ  xed eﬀects. Observations are clustered at the industry post level.
∗∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 10 percent level.Entrepreneurship and Credit Constraints    2 6 9
to the situation before 1993, and relative to industries that remained eli-
gible. This shock explains some 0.4 standard deviation of the log- number of 
SOFARIS- backed  ﬁ  rms (ln (SOF. Firms)) in the industry level sample.
In the equation of interest (see table 8.13), OLS estimates suggest that 
Table 8.13  Industry level second-  stage regression: Number of guaranteed ﬁ  rms and 
ﬁ  rm creation
log(ﬁ  rms creation)
log(employment 
creation) log(new assets)
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
    (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)
log(number of guaranteed
 ﬁ  rms)
.17∗∗∗ .037 .13∗∗ .18∗ .26∗∗∗ .46∗
(.059) (.15) (.063) (.11) (.1) (.26)
Treatment   t .061 .086 .041∗ .033 –.027 –.073
(.038) (.056) (.025) (.033) (.048) (.072)
Post   Treatment   t –.068 –.055 .011 .0061 –.012 –.014
(.063) (.048) (.048) (.042) (.12) (.11)
Post   ROA(0) .076 –.22 .15 .25 .45 .9
(.3) (.42) (.24) (.27) (.7) (.84)
Post   Leverage(0) –.27 –.35 –.49∗∗∗ –.46∗∗∗ –.46∗∗ –.38∗
(.34) (.34) (.18) (.16) (.23) (.23)
Post   log(assets)(0) .31∗∗∗ .28∗∗∗ .17∗∗ .18∗∗∗ .46∗∗∗ .5∗∗∗
(.094) (.089) (.07) (.066) (.13) (.14)
Post   log(employment)(0) –.45∗∗∗ –.37∗∗∗ –.29∗∗∗ –.32∗∗∗ –.67∗∗∗ –.78∗∗∗
(.11) (.13) (.093) (.094) (.18) (.21)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 264 264 264 264 242 242
Marginal eﬀect of a one SD increase (35) in the number of guaranteed ﬁ  rms
# ﬁ  rms (col. [1], [2]) or 
  workers (col. [3], [4]) 1,322 267 922 1,277 8.18 106 15.56 106
as a % of level dependent 
 variable  SD   0.112   0.023   0.092   0.076   0.108   0.205
Source: BRN, RSI and SIRENE ﬁ  les for the 1989–2000 period.
Notes: The dependent variable is the logarithm of the total number of ﬁ  rms created at the 2-  digit indus-
try level (columns [1] and [2]), the logarithm of total employment in newly created ﬁ  rms at the 2-  digit 
industry level (columns [3] and [4]) and the logarithm of total assets in newly created ﬁ  rms at the 2-  digit 
industry level (columns [3] and [4]). “log(number of guaranteed ﬁ  rms)” is the logarithm of the total 
number of ﬁ  rms with a guaranteed loan in the industry. “Treatment” is a dummy variable equal to 1 
for industries that became eligible after 1995. “Post” is a dummy variable equal to 1 for observations 
posterior to 1995 (excluding 1995). Variable t is a linear trend. Except when speciﬁ  ed, all variables refer 
to ﬁ  rms aged 3 years or less. “ROA(0)” (resp. “Leverage(0)”) is deﬁ  ned, at the industry level, as the sum of 
EBITDA (resp. ﬁ  nancial debt) divided by the sum of total assets in the industry and is measured in 1989. 
“log(Assets)(0)” (resp. “log(Employment)(0)”) is the logarithm of the sum of assets (resp. employment) in 
the industry measured in 1989. Each regression includes year and industry ﬁ  xed eﬀects. Observations are 
clustered at the industry post level.
∗∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 10 percent level.270    Claire Lelarge, David Sraer, and David Thesmar
there is a positive correlation between the number of SOFARIS loans and 
industry level ﬁ  rms’ creation rates, but two-  stage least squares (2SLS) esti-
mates are not statistically signiﬁ  cant and do not show any causal impact 
of the SOFARIS intervention on creation rates. However, and consistently 
with ﬁ  rm level analyses, OLS and IV estimates suggest that guaranteed 
loans enable newly created ﬁ  rms to hire more employees and to invest in 
more early stage capital: a 1 percent increase in the number of SOFARIS 
loans implies a 0.18 percent increase in the number of employees in newly 
created ﬁ  rms. In other words, at the sample mean industry, additional 2.6 
SOFARIS- backed  ﬁ  rms induce 1.7 additional jobs created at the earliest 
stage of these ﬁ  rms’ development. Reassuringly, this 0.65 additional job per 
subsidized ﬁ  rm obtained with an industry level analysis is in line with the 
result obtained in the short term when controlling for individual heterogene-
ity at the ﬁ  rm level.
8.7    Conclusion
Motivated by perennial concerns about the role of capital market imper-
fections in entrepreneurship and the prevalence of government programs 
focused on encouraging new business formation, this chapter evaluates the 
impact of a French loan guarantee program on new business formation and 
growth. Our empirical strategy exploits an exogenous regulatory shift in the 
mid- 1990s, which led to an increase in the overall size of the program and to 
the new eligibility of several industries. Using a detailed data set with infor-
mation on all new French ﬁ  rms founded between 1988 and 1999, we provide 
a diﬀerence- in- diﬀerences estimation of the impact of the loan guarantee 
program on the creation and growth of start- up ﬁ  rms. At the industry level, 
the availability of loan guarantees has no impact on the overall number of 
ﬁ  rms created, but makes the average new venture larger, both in terms of 
assets and employment. At the ﬁ  rm level, the obtention of a loan guarantee 
helps newly created ﬁ  rms grow faster. However, it also signiﬁ  cantly increases 
their probability of default, suggesting that risk shifting may be a serious 
drawback of such loan guarantee programs.
Our results raise a number of questions requiring further inquiry. As pre-
viously stated, in absence of a thorough structural model, it is diﬃcult to 
interpret whether our results are mainly driven by the magnitude of credit 
constraints, or by the unavoidable distortions induced by the speciﬁ  c features 
of the SOFARIS loan guarantee scheme. As pointed out by Beck, Klapper, 
and Mendoza (2008), prices and coverage ratios (but also the assignment 
of responsibilities among government), private sector, and donors might be 
important for the incentives of lenders in screening and monitoring lenders 
properly. Disentangling the relative contribution of the nested principal-
  agent relationships between public agencies, lenders, and borrowers would 
require a more structural approach than the reduced- form estimation strat-
egy proposed in our contribution, which we let for future research.Entrepreneurship and Credit Constraints    2 7 1
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